Abstract. We present a new modal access control logic ACL + to specify, reason about and enforce access control policies. The logic includes new modalities for permission, control, and ratification to overcome some limits of current access control logics. We present a Hilbert-style proof system for ACL + and a sound and complete Kripke semantics for it. We exploit Kripke semantics to define Seq-ACL + : a sound, complete, cut-free and terminating calculus for ACL + , proving that ACL + is decidable. We point at a Prolog implementation of Seq-ACL + and discuss possible extensions of ACL + with axioms for subordination between principals.
Introduction
Logic plays a prominent role in the specification, reasoning and enforcement of access control policies in distributed systems. In the last two decades, several logic-based formal systems for access control have been proposed (see [1, 3] and [7] for surveys), each with its own primitives, semantics and, in some cases, specific application domains. The great variety (and complexity) of such systems makes it difficult to integrate, compare and objectively evaluate them. As is evident from recent research in access control [2, 8, 11, 14, 17] , modal logic is a powerful framework to study expressiveness, decidability, complexity and semantics of access control logics. Although modal logic has proved useful for theoretical study of access control, it is not widely used in practice to enforce authorization policies (some notable exceptions are [5, 6, 13, 21, 22] ).
The main reason for this gap is that although several epistemic modalities (e.g., says [18] , said and knows [17] ) have been studied in the context of access control, key access control concepts like permission, control or trust are not first-class citizens of modal access control languages and must be defined using epistemic modalities. This creates implicit relationships between the concepts and possibly leads to security risks (see [2] for some examples).
In this paper, we take a step towards addressing this shortcoming by proposing a constructive modal logic, ACL + , which extends a standard access control logic with new connectives for permission, control and trust on principals' statements, and admits a decidable calculus. We start by presenting a brief outline of the methodology of access control through logics in Section 2, and a specific connective says [18] that is central to almost all access control logics. In Section 3 we point at three shortcomings of saysbased access control logics that, in our opinion, limit their applicability in practical scenarios, thus motivating the need for the new modalities. In Section 4 we present the new modalities, their axioms and inference rules in a Hilbert-style calculus for ACL + . Moreover, we show through examples how ACL + avoids the shortcomings reported in Section 3.
Section 5 presents sound and complete Kripke semantics for ACL + . Kripke semantics, although useful for establishing several metatheorems of access control logics, are not operational and cannot be used directly in algorithms to reason about authorization problems. Accordingly, in Section 6 we present Seq-ACL + , a sound, complete, cut-free and terminating calculus for ACL + . In Section 7 we present extensions of ACL + with axioms that force subordination between principals. Section 8 discusses briefly some related work and Section 9 concludes the paper. A full version of this paper with proofs of theorems and an implementation of the decision procedure for ACL + are available from the authors' webpages.
Distributed Access Control Model
We consider a decentralized model of access control, where policy information is distributed among several principals. Principals support policy statements and credentials by writing them in certificates signed with their respective private keys. Since policy statements and credentials may be complex, and may assert facts conditional upon statements of other principals, logic is a natural choice to model policies. If principal A supports policy (or credential) ϕ, this is represented in the logic as the formula A says ϕ [18] . Technically, A says • is a family of principal-indexed modalities that has been included in several access control logics, albeit with slightly varying semantic interpretations.
An access is authorized (justified) if and only if it is entailed by available policy statements and credentials. The question of authorizing an access ϕ for principal A from a policy Γ can be cast formally as follows: Is it the case that Γ and A says ϕ entail ϕ? Or, in symbolic notation, is there a proof that Γ, A says ϕ ϕ? Example 1. Consider the following policy:
1. If the Admin says that f ile1 can be read, then this must be the case 1 . 2. Admin trusts Bob to decide whether f ile1 can be read.
In a propositional logic L enriched with the says modality and equipped with an entailment relation L , we can express the above policy as follows [2] :
Further, Bob asking to read f ile1 can be represented as Bob says read f ile1. The reference monitor may authorize Bob on this request if and only if (1), (2) , Bob says read f ile1 L read f ile1 1 In other words, Admin has direct permission to read f ile1.
In most access control logics, the above entailment has a proof, so Bob will be able to read f ile1. We re-emphasize that the notion of authorization w.r.t. to a submitted request corresponds to the formal notion of derivability of the requested access from the available policy.
3 Limits of Access Control Logics: Permissions, Control and Information Flow
In this Section we point out three issues that, in our opinion, create a gap between existing work on logic-based approaches to access control as outlined above, and their deployment in practice. We call the first issue the problem of implicit permissions: If an action ϕ is entailed by a policy Γ , then any principal is authorized to perform it. The second issue concerns a logical separation of permission to perform an action from the ability to control the action, which also includes the permission to delegate the control further. The third issue is concerned with a fine-grained distinction between the flow of information (policy statements) from one principal to another, and its acceptance by the receiving principal or, in other words, the issue of separating (in the logic) hearsay from trust in the hearsay. We explain these issues one by one, and then present our proposal to address the issues by introducing new modalities into the logic.
Issue 1: Implicit permissions
The (standard) definition of permission through entailment presented in Section 2 says that a principal A can perform action ϕ if from the prevailing policy Γ and A says ϕ, ϕ can be established. However, this creates a problem in practice: Once enough credentials exist to authorize an access for some principal, any principal is permitted the same access by the standard definition. For instance, in our earlier example, after Bob has created the credential Bob says read f ile1, any principal A will be authorized to read f ile1. This is because the existence of a proof of Γ, Bob says read f ile1 read f ile1 implies, by the law of weakening in the logic, that Γ, Bob says read f ile1, A says read f ile1 read f ile1 is also provable for any principal A. The problem here is that the formula asserting the authorization -read f ile1 -does not include the identity of the principal who is authorized access. We propose to resolve this problem by introducing an explicit, principal-indexed modality for permissions, which we write P A ϕ (Section 4). With this modality, principal A is authorized to perform action ϕ iff Γ P A ϕ. By explicitly listing the principal authorized in the conclusion, we eliminate the problem of implicit permissions.
An alternate, related solution, not considered here, but often used in first-order logics for access control, is to treat the permission (e.g., read f ile1) as a relation over principals. Instead of writing read f ile1 we could write read f ile1(A) to mean that principal A is authorized to read f ile1. However, since we are interested in proving decidability for the logic, we avoid first-order logic.
Issue 2: Control or Delegatable Permissions
Often in access control, it is desirable to give an individual a permission and also the power to further delegate the permission. To this end we propose a new modality C A ϕ, read "A controls ϕ". The key axioms governing C A ϕ are:
The first axiom means that if principal A controls ϕ, then it is also permitted ϕ. This axiom relates control to permission and makes C A ϕ strictly stronger than P A ϕ. The second axiom allows principal A, who controls ϕ, to delegate this control to a principal B simply by asserting this fact. This ability to delegate further distinguishes C A ϕ from
For instance, if A has control over the deletion of files 1 and 2 individually, it should also have control over the deletion of the two files together, thus allowing it to delegate control over deletion of both files at once. A similar property for permissions may be harmful. For instance, if file 2 is the backup of file 1, we may not want to permit their simultaneous deletion (P A (ϕ 1 ∧ ϕ 2 )), even if we allow their deletion individually (P A ϕ 1 ∧ P A ϕ 2 ). Formally, this difference is manifest in different logical treatments of the two modalities: while C A is a normal necessitation modality, P A is a possibility modality (see Section 4 for details).
Issue 3: Information Flow vs Acceptance
Besides the use of the modality C A , authority can also be delegated from one principal to another by nesting the says modality, as in the following statement from Example 1, which delegates the formula read f ile1 from principal Admin to principal Bob:
Intuitively, we expect (as in Example 1) that this formula together with Bob says read f ile1 should imply that Admin says read f ile1. However, performing this inference requires us to infer from Bob says read f ile1 that Admin says Bob says read f ile1. To allow for this inference, most authorization logics include the following axiom, or a stronger axiom that implies it (this axiom was proposed by Abadi [1] ):
However, this axiom also allows unwanted statements to flow from one principal to another. Here is an example. Suppose Admin delegates to Bob the authority to read f ile1 through statement (2), under the conception that Bob will only allow read f ile1 under reasonable conditions. However, Bob, mistakenly or maliciously, adds the following rule:
where bad condition means that a certain bad condition (for reading f ile1) holds. Now, using the statements above and (I-SS), Bob says bad condition implies that Admin says read f ile1, which is undesirable.
The problem here is that the logic, so far, does not provide a construct to allow Admin to represent in statement (2) that it actually trusts the assumption (Bob says read f ile1). We propose to rectify this situation by including the construct A ratified ϕ, which means that A says ϕ and that this statement is trusted by the principal in the enclosing scope. With this construct, Admin can revise its statement to say that:
If Bob merely says read f ile1, it will imply Admin says Bob says read f ile1, but not Admin says Bob ratified read f ile1, and not allow for the deduction of Admin says read f ile1. To allow for the latter, Admin must make explicit rules to convert Bob's statements to ratified statements, e.g., it may add the following two rules:
thus allowing deduction of Admin says read f ile1 from the statements Bob says (good condition → read f ile1) and Bob says good condition, but not from Bob says (bad condition → read f ile1) and Bob says bad condition. The formal rules that allow these deductions and a more detailed example of the use of ratification are presented in Section 4.
The New Modalities
In this section we present ACL + , an access control logic with the modalities P A , C A and A ratified •. To summarize, 1. Permission and control can be represented directly in ACL + using the modalities P A ϕ (principal A is authorized (permitted) ϕ) and C A ϕ (principal A controls ϕ).
ACL
+ contains the operator A ratified ϕ, which means that principal A states ϕ and this statement has been ratified (or, is trusted) by the principal in whose context the formula is interpreted.
We introduce ACL + piecewise, starting with a simple access control logic containing the modality says defined by the following rules and axioms:
We note that our logic is intuitionistic (constructive). The use of intuitionistic logic for access control has been motivated in prior work [12] ; briefly, constructivism disallows proofs by contradiction, thus eliminating authorization if it is merely not denied. Axioms (MP) and (nec-S) express that says is a normal necessitation modality and are standard in access control literature.
Permission and Control
To this basic logic we add the modalities P A and C A , characterized by the following rules and axioms:
Definition 1 (Axioms and Rules for P A and C A ).
Axiom (C-Deduce) expresses that control is closed under logical deduction while rule (nec-C) means that all valid formulas of the logic are controlled by every principal A.
Together, (nec-C) and (C-Deduce) make C A a normal necessitation modality (similar to 2 in standard modal logics). As motivated in Section 3, we model permission with a possibility modality, i.e., it is not closed under logical consequence, but we require it to distribute over disjunction (or-P). Axiom (C2P) relates the notion of control with that of permission and reads: "If principal A controls ϕ, then it is authorized (permitted) on ϕ". This implies that control of a formula is stronger than permission on the formula. Axiom (del-C) allows a principal A in control of ϕ to delegate that control to another principal B (see Example 2).
Definition 2 (Authorization).
Given a policy Γ , we say that A is authorized on access ϕ if and only if Γ P A ϕ.
Example 2. The policy of Example 1 can be re-represented with the new modalities as follows
From (del-C), (MP) and (C2P) we can prove that Bob is authorized to read file1, i.e., (1), (2) P Bob (read f ile1).
Example 3. A principal can selectively delegate privileges it controls to other principals. Consider a policy in which A controls the deletion of files 1 and 2. A can delegate to B only the authority to delete file 1 by asserting that B controls it. Formally,
Proof. From the assumption C A (delete f ile1 ∧ delete f ile2) infer using (nec-C) and (C-deduce) that C A (delete f ile1). C B (delete f ile1) follows using (del-C) and the assumption A says (C B (delete f ile1)).
The Modality (A ratified ϕ)
Next, we add to our logic the modality A ratified ϕ, which means not only that A says ϕ, but also that the latter has been checked, ratified, or is trusted by the principal in whose scope it occurs (Section 3) 2 . For instance, the formula B says (A ratified ϕ) means that: "A says ϕ and B ratified (trusts) this statement". The resulting logic is called ACL + . Like C A and A says •, we model A ratified • as a normal modality:
Further, the modality A ratified ϕ implies A says ϕ, but the converse is not true in general:
The axiom (RS) makes A ratified ϕ stronger than A says ϕ. Statement ϕ directly signed by a principal can be taken as an evidence of A says ϕ, not A ratified ϕ.
(I-SS) and (RS) together imply that:
but it is not possible to derive in general that (A says ϕ) → B says A ratified ϕ which would be unjustified because if A says ϕ, then B has not necessarily ratified it.
Example 4. The purpose of introducing ratified is to allow a principal control over what statements and proofs of another principal it will admit as trusted. Assume that a hospital administrator P A controls access to sensitive patient records. The main policy is that "a doctor has access to all patient records" and the determination of who constitutes a doctor comes from the principal HR, representing the human resources database. Let C A (access records) mean that principal A has control over the access to patient records and isDoctor A mean that A is a doctor. The main policy can be encoded as the formula 3 :
Observe that we are using (HR ratified . . .) inside the policy instead of (HR says . . .) to make sure that consequences of the policy depend only on statements of HR that have been ratified by P A. Now, P A can choose to trust the policies of HR selectively. For instance, if P A trusts all deductions of the form isDoctor A that HR may make, it can have the policy:
Then, for any principal A, we have that (P 1), (P 2), HR says (isDoctor A) P A says C A (access records)
If, on the other hand, P A only trusts HR's statements about two principals Alice and Bob, it can selectively assert (in place of (P2)) that: P A says ((HR says isDoctor Alice) → (HR ratified isDoctor Alice)) P A says ((HR says isDoctor Bob) → (HR ratified isDoctor Bob))
As a last illustration, suppose that the HR has two policies, one of which states that every administrator is a doctor and the other of which (mistakenly) states that every hospital employee is a doctor:
P A can choose to ratify the first of these, but not the second, by asserting in place of (P2) that:
Suppose that HR says isAdmin Alice. Then, we can deduce P A says C Alice (access records) from (P1), (P3), (P5) and (P6) as follows:
From (P3) and (I-SS), deduce that
P A says (HR says ( A∈P (isAdmin A → isDoctor A)))
From (1), (K-S) and (P5) deduce that
3. From (HR says isAdmin Alice) and (I-SS) deduce that (P A says HR says isAdmin Alice) 4. From (3), (K-S) and (P6) deduce that (P A says HR ratified isAdmin Alice) 5. From (2), (4), (K-S), and (K-R) deduce that (P A says HR ratified isDoctor Alice) 6. From (5), (P1), and (K-S) deduce that (P A says C Alice (access records))
If we replace the assumption (HR says isAdmin Alice) with the assumption (HR says isEmployee Alice), then we cannot deduce (P A says (C Alice (access records))) because we cannot deduce (5) above. In place of (5), we can deduce only the weaker statement (P A says (HR says isDoctor Alice)), which does not imply (P A says C Alice (access records)) in our theory.
Semantics
In this section, we define sound and complete semantics for ACL + . Our semantics uses graph-based structures called Kripke models, that are standard in modal logic. Although Kripke semantics are not necessarily intuitive, they lead directly to a proof theory for the logic, a decidability result for it, and an implementation of its decision procedure (Section 6).
Definition 3. An intuitionistic model, M, of ACL
+ is a tuple
where -P is a set of principals.
-(W, ≤) is a preorder, where elements of W are called states or worlds, and ≤ is a binary relation over W which satisfies the following conditions
(trans) -S A , C A , R A and P A are binary relations on W that satisfy the following conditions:
(mon-P) -h is an assignment which, for each atom q, assigns the subset of worlds h(q) ⊆ W where q holds. Moreover, we require h to be monotone w.r.t. ≤, i.e., if x ∈ h(q) and x ≤ y then y ∈ h(q).
Conditions above ensure monotonicity of the logic (Lemma 1), which is a standard property of Kripke semantics for constructive logics. Moreover, to force ACL + models to admit the axioms (I-SS), (C2P), (del-C) and (RS) we require the following to hold for any two principals A and B.
∀x, y, z.(((xS
An interpretation for the logic is a pair M, t where M is a model and t is a world in M.
Definition 4 (Satisfaction Relation). The satisfaction relation "|=" between interpretations and formulae of the logic is defined as follows.
for all s such that tS A s we have M, s |= ϕ -M, t |= C A ϕ iff for all s such that tC A s we have M, s |= ϕ -M, t |= A ratified ϕ iff for all s such that tR A s we have M, s |= ϕ -M, t |= P A ϕ iff there exists an s, tP A s such that M, s |= ϕ Lemma 1 (Monotonicity). For any formula ϕ and any interpretation M, t, if M, t |= ϕ and t ≤ s then M, s |= ϕ.
We say that M |= ϕ if for all t ∈ M, it is the case that M, t |= ϕ. Further, Γ |= ϕ if for every M satisfying the above conditions, M |= Γ implies M |= ϕ.
We note that the conditions (s-I-SS), (s-C2P), (s-del-C) and (s-RS) are canonical for the axioms (I-SS), (C2P), (del-C) and (RS), respectively, i.e., a logic with any subset of these axioms is sound and complete with respect to models that satisfy the conditions corresponding to the chosen axioms.
A Semantic-Based Calculus for ACL

+
In this section we briefly present Seq-ACL + , a sound, complete and cut-free sequent calculus for ACL + . The calculus is inspired by the work of Negri [19] 4 and follows the so-called labeled approach [4, 20] , which directly uses the Kripke semantics. The use of labeled sequent calculi for access control is relatively new and has been introduced in [15, 16] to define proof theory of a specific says-based access control logic. The sequent calculus directly leads to a decision procedure for the logic ACL + . Seq-ACL + manipulates two types of labeled formulas:
1. World formulas, denoted by x : ϕ, where x is a world and ϕ is a well formed formula of ACL + , intuitively meaning that ϕ holds in world x. 2. Transition formulas representing semantic accessibility relationships. These formulas have one of the forms xS A y, xC A y, xR A y, xP A y and x ≤ y.
A sequent is a tuple Σ, M, Γ, ∆ , usually written Σ; M; Γ ⇒ ∆ where M, Γ and ∆ are multisets of labeled formulas and Σ is the set of labels (worlds) appearing in the rest of the sequent. Intuitively, the sequent Σ; M; Γ ⇒ ∆ means that "every model which satisfies all labeled formulas of Γ ∪ M satisfies at least one labeled formula in ∆". This is made precise by the notion of validity in the following definition.
Definition 5 (Sequent validity). Given a model
and a label alphabet A, consider a mapping I : A → W . Let F denote a labeled formula. Define M |= I F as follows:
We say that Σ; M; Γ ⇒ ∆ is valid in M if, for every mapping I : A → W , if M |= I F for every F ∈ M ∪ Γ , then M |= I G for some G ∈ ∆. We say that Σ; M; Γ ⇒ ∆ is valid in Seq-ACL + if it is valid in every M. Figure 1 lists the rules of the calculus Seq-ACL + , divided into four groups.
-Axiom rules do not have premises and describe valid sequents.
-Logical rules operate on connectives of the logic. For reasons of space, we omit some rules: ∧L,∧R,∨L and ∨R 5 are standard (see, for instance, [19] ) while rules for says and ratified have the same structure as those for C.
-Semantic rules define the properties that hold for relationships ≤, S A , R A , C A and P A in all ACL + models. -Access control rules codify axioms that differentiate ACL + from other constructive normal modal logics, i.e., (I-SS), (C2P), (del-C) and (RS).
Note that semantic and access control rules are in one-to-one correspondence with semantic conditions of Definition 3.
We say that a sequent Σ; M; Γ ⇒ ∆ is derivable in Seq-ACL + if it admits a derivation. A derivation is a tree whose nodes are sequents. A branch is a sequence of nodes . If a formula α is valid in ACL + (i.e., |= α), then x; ; ⇒ x : α is derivable in Seq-ACL + .
Axiom Rules y new Fig. 1 . Seq-ACL + Rules
Termination
Next, we use the sequent calculus Seq-ACL + to prove that the logic ACL + is decidable. Note that admissibility of cut (Theorem 3) alone does not ensure the termination of backward proof search in the sequent calculus because access control rules and the rules saysL, ratifiedL, CL, and PR may increase the complexity of sequents in a backward proof search. Accordingly, we prove that these "critical" rules can be applied in a controlled way. For instance, the following Lemma states the use of CL, PR, and access control rules can be limited. (Without loss of generality we assume that the root of each proof has the form x; ; ⇒ x : ϕ).
Lemma 2 (Controlled use of rules). In each branch of a backward proof search, it is useless to: (1) apply CL on the same transition relation xC A y ∈ M more than once, (2) apply PR on the same transition relation xP A y ∈ M more than once, (3) apply rule χ for χ ∈ {mon-S,mon-R,mon-C,mon-P,sym,trans,s-I-SS,s-del-C,s-C2P,s-RS} on the same transition formula (or label as in s-RS) more than once.
However, even the above Lemma is not sufficient to ensure termination of backward proof search. In particular, there are two issues:
1. Interaction of the rule (trans) with → L adds new accessible worlds, and we can build chains of accessible worlds on which → L can be applied ad infinitum. 2. Application of rules (s-del-C) and (s-C2P) generates transition relations with new labels that can be used for repeated application of the same rules.
We bound the number of such interactions using a counting argument. Let depth(F ) be the height of the parse tree of formula F .
Definition 6 (Label distance)
. Given a sequent Σ, M, Γ ⇒ ∆ and two labels x and y such that x ≤ y ∈ M, we define the distance d(x, y) between two labels as 0 when x = y and n when x = y, where n is the length of the longest sequence of transitions in M "connecting" the two labels, i.e., x
Lemma 3 (Bounded application of rules). Let x, x 1 be labels and F a formula such that d(x, x 1 ) > depth(F ). Then, in each branch of a backwards proof search starting with x; ; ⇒ x : F , it is useless to: (1) apply →L on a transition formula x 1 ≤ x 2 , (2) apply s-C2P on a label x 1 , (3) apply s-del-C on a transition formula x 1 C B x 2 .
Using this lemma, we obtain decidability for ACL + .
Theorem 6 (Decidability). The logic ACL + is decidable.
Our proof of decidability directly leads to a decision procedure for ACL + . A Prolog implementation of the procedure is available from the authors' webpages. The correspondence between semantic conditions and axioms allows us to modularly extend ACL + with new axioms, and new (corresponding) sequent calculus rules. The difficult aspect in any such extension is to prove decidability. As a specific case, we show here how we may extend the logic with new subordination axioms of any of the following forms, and obtain decidability again. (In these axioms A and B are specific principals, not metavariables, but ϕ is a metavariable standing for all formulas.)
A ratified ϕ → B ratified ϕ (sub-R)
We call these axioms subordination axioms because each axiom suggests that one of the two principals A and B is subordinate to the other. The first (second) axiom means that statements (ratifications) of A are echoed by B, so B is, in a sense, subordinate to A. The third (fourth) axiom means that if A has a permission (ability to control), then so does B, so B is more powerful than A. Corresponding access control rules for the sequent calculus are shown in Figure 2 .
Lemma 4. The extension of Seq-ACL + with any subset of the rules in Figure 2 is sound and complete w.r.t. models that satisfy corresponding conditions from Definition 7. Further, the extended calculus admits cut and is decidable.
Related Work
The study of formal properties of says and other constructs in modal logic is a relatively new research trend. Prior work by the second author [10] adopts a modified version of constructive modal logic S4 called DTL 0 and shows how existing access control logics can be embedded (via translation) into DTL 0 . Other work [11] translates existing access control logics into S4 by relying on a slight simplification of Gödel's translation from intuitionistic logic to S4, and extending it to formulas of the form A says ϕ. The first author has developed conditional logics as a general framework for modular sequent calculi for standard access control logics with the says connective [15, 16] . Dinesh et al. [9] present an access control logic based on says and extended with obligation and permissions, but their treatment of permissions is different from ours and is closely tied to says. The use of canonical properties for access control axioms was first considered in [8] where standard access control axioms (e.g. (unit) and (hand-off)) are characterized in terms of first-order conditions on Kripke models.
Conclusion
We have presented ACL + , a constructive multi-modal logic for access control that introduces three new modalities P A (permission), C A (control), and ratified (trusted statement) to fix some practical problems in reasoning with policies. The connectives of the logic are defined by a sound and complete Kripke semantics for ACL + together with a correspondence between conditions on models and the logic's axioms. The semantics lead to Seq-ACL + , a sound, complete, cut-free and terminating calculus for ACL + . Finally, ACL + can be extended with new axioms, as illustrated by examples of axioms for specific kinds of subordination among principals.
